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BANKING-DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS-THE DUTY OF A BANK 
AS To CUSTOMER INFORMATION-The lawyer who attempts to 
advise a bank on its duty as to the disclosure of information it has 
received concerning its customers, including communications from 
the customer himself, enters a puzzling area of the law. The dif-
ficulty is not primarily a conceptual one but rather a surprising 
scarcity of American authority clearly defining the duty, an in-
adequate amount of legal literature in the area,1 and a lack of 
consistent treatment of customer information by banks. One can 
only speculate on the cause of the scarcity of authority, but cer-
tainly the traditionally conservative treatment given customer 
information by American bankers and the use of extralegal rules2 
to guide bankers on certain aspects of its duty regarding this in-
formation at least partially explain the doctrinal void. Another 
factor is the tendency of courts to approach this problem 
obliquely-as a question of whether a banker has a testimonial 
privilege to refuse to reveal information concerning his customers 
when ordered to do so by a court3 or governmental agency4-
which has resulted in the development of a relatively substantial 
body of case law detailing instances when a bank may not refuse 
to disclose information, and a marked absence of any definitive 
statement on the other, more positive, aspects of the duty itself. 
A final possible reason for the scarcity of authority is a lack 
of recognition of the legal implications of the bank-depositor rela-
tionship despite increased awareness of the importance of an 
individual's credit standing in our present economic framework. 
1 The only two adequate discussions of the area may be found in l PATON'S DIGEST 
OF LEGAL OPINIONS § 19 (4th ed. 1940) and Limburg, The Bankers' and Brokers' Privi-
lege, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 152 (1925). 
2 See, e.g., Robert Morris Associates Code of Ethics for the Exchange of Information. 
A code of credit ethics adopted in 1916 by The Robert Morris Associates dedicated to 
maintaining the exchange of credit information on a highly confidential and ethical 
level, the code is voluntarily subscribed to by a large number of banks and savings 
institutions. 
3 See, e.g., Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. 
McGranery, Ill F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953). 
4 See, e.g., ICC v. Harriman, 157 Fed. 432 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908). 
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The purpose of this comment, therefore, is to describe the 
scope of the banker's duty as to customer information as best it 
can be discerned in light of the increasing exchange of credit 
information and increasing resort to such information by govern-
ment agencies-particularly the Internal Revenue Service. In the 
process, it is hoped that attention will be drawn to the uncertainty 
which exists in this area, perhaps prompting action by the states 
or the banks themselves to clarify the scope of the duty and to 
encourage uniform treatment of customer information in a man-
ner consistent with this duty. 
The Duty Owed by a Bank to Its Customers 
Three possible bases have been suggested for imposing upon 
a bank the duty of secrecy as to customer information or, stated 
conversely, for giving the customer a privilege of non-disclosure. 
An early American case based its finding of such a duty on the 
theory that the customer held a property interest in the informa-
tion contained in the bank's records of his accounts, deposits, and 
withdrawals.5 Presumably because of the more acceptable basis 
discussed below, this proprietary analysis has received no addi-
tional support. Secondly, it has been suggested that any com-
munication from customer to bank be regarded as privileged,6 
much as is a communication between attorney and client. Al-
though this suggestion will be discussed more thoroughly below, 
it will suffice here to point out that it has been consistently re-
jected by American courts.7 The third theory, accepted by those 
American writers who have considered the problem, is that first 
announced in the leading English case of Tournier v. National 
Provincial & Union Bank of England.8 
The rather complex fact situation of this important case may 
be summarized as follows. Plaintiff was an overdrawn depositor 
of defendant bank who had fallen behind in his payments to cover 
his deficiency. While employed by K company he received a 
check drawn by X, another of defendant's customers. Plaintiff 
endorsed this check to L, who deposited it in his own bank. On 
the return of the check, the defendant bank inquired of the last 
5 Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34: (1929). 
6 1 PATON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 620. 
7 See, e.g., Smith v. Dawson, 234 S.W. 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). 
s (1924] 1 K.B. 461. 
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named bank as to who had deposited the check. Upon learning 
that L was a bookie, the defendant bank unsolicitedly disclosed 
this fact to plaintiff's employer. When plaintiff's employment 
contract ended, K company refused to renew it, and plaintiff 
brought an action at law for damages. On plaintiff's cause of ac-
tion9 for breach of defendant's duty not to disclose to any third per-
son either the state of plaintiff's account or any information the 
defendant had acquired regarding the plaintiff, the jury found 
for defendant.10 The court of appeals reversed, holding that as a 
matter of law the obligation of secrecy was an implied term of the 
contract between the bank and its depositor. 
The English court's finding of an implied contractual duty of 
secrecy seems to have been based on the confidential relationship 
then existing between the bank and its customer,11 an analysis of 
dubious applicability to American banking because of the general 
disagreement among our courts on the question of the confiden-
tiality of the banker-customer relationship. Authorities range 
from the view that the relationship itself is no more than that 
of debtor-creditor, and therefore not confidential, 12 to the belief 
that the relationship itself, like that of lawyer and client, is con-
fidential.13 While some banker-customer relationships fall within 
the confidential area, the vast majority, in which the average 
depositor thinks of the bank merely as a safe place in which to 
keep his money, do not.14 The more realistic approach, therefore, 
is to recognize that the duty itself need not depend upon the 
existence of a confidential relationship and can be more accu-
rately thought of as a product of the confidence customarily ac-
9 Plaintiff also brought an action for slander with which we are not here concerned. 
Toumier v. National Provincial &: Union Bank of England, supra note 8, at 462. 
10 The jury had been instructed that if the "banker has made that disclosure justi-
fiably, that is to say, if, under the circumstances of the particular case, it was reason-
able and proper that he should make the communication, then there is no breach of 
contract on his part." Id. at 471. Bankes, L. J., said in speaking of the instruction, "it 
is leaving to the jury a question which is primarily a question for the judge, and ..• 
it leaves the jury entirely without instruction as to what the circumstances are which 
they are entitled to take into consideration in arriving at a conclusion as to what is 
reasonable and what is proper." Id. at 472. 
11 Id. at 464. 
12 See, e.g., Klatt v. First State Bank, 206 Iowa 252, 220 N.W. 318 (1928). See also 
5A MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING 12, 15 (1950). 
13 See, e.g., Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34 (1929); cf. Hansen, Internal 
Revenue Examinations of Customers' Accounts, 73 BANKING L.J. 163, 164 (1956). 
14 Limburg, supra note 1, at 157. 
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corded such information by bankers.15 In any event, a difference 
of opinion over the basis of the duty need not detract from the 
aid given by T ournier to an understanding of its scope. 
The English court, cognizant of the need to balance the cus-
tomer's need for privacy in order to protect his credit standing 
with the need of banks and the economy in general for a certain 
amount of interchange of credit information and the public need 
for disclosure of customer information in such areas 4s tax inves-
tigation, qualified its general statement of legal duty with four 
broad exceptions: "(a)Where disclosure is under compulsion by 
law; (b) Where there is a duty to the public to disclose; ( c) Where 
the interests of the bank require disclosure; (d) Where the dis-
closure is made by the express or implied consent of the cus-
tomer."16 
Although Tournier has been criticized for its failure to define 
more clearly the duty owed, it having been said that the court 
merely stated "but an implication qualified by other implica-
tions,"17 the case nevertheless gives English banking law a degree 
of certainty in this area that its American counterpart lacks. As 
a result, in the absence of applicable American authority, some 
writers have concluded that Tournier states the law as it would 
be found to exist by an American court.18 No case has clearly so 
held, nor has the writer come across any case clearly raising the 
issue, but this assumption seems fairly reasonable, in view of the 
customary confidential treatment given by American banks to 
customer information, the need in our credit-conscious economy 
for protection of an individual's credit, and other instances of the 
use of English decisions to guide American courts.19 Therefore, 
by drawing from Tournier and certain American authority which 
delineate areas in which a bank clearly cannot withhold customer 
information,20 it is possible to sketch in the scope of an American 
bank's duty as to customer information. The very sources used, 
however, evidence the uncertainty which attends the law in this 
area and highlights the need for more authoritative statements 
of this duty. 
15 See Limburg, supra note I, at 157-58 for a discussion of the logic of deriving this 
duty from custom. 
16 Toumier v. National Provincial Se Union Bank of England, [1924] I K.B. 461, 473. 
11 40 L.Q. REv. 278, 279 (1924). 
18 See commentaries cited note I supra. 
19 See, e.g., The Turret Crown, 297 Fed. 766, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1924). 
20 See cases cited notes 3 and 4 supra. 
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Disclosure in the Absence of Subpoena 
When Consent Has Been Given: There is little doubt that a 
state bank has the power to disclose general information regard-
ing the credit position of a depositor if the customer has con-
sented. 21 The practice is general and is in fact a necessity in 
today's complex credit economy. As the duty of secrecy is a con-
tractual relation, ad hoc consent is merely a form of waiver re-
leasing the bank from any obligation to refrain from disclosing 
the requested information.22 However, if the consent is given at 
the time the relationship is born, the consent would be evidence 
from which to infer that no obligation ever existed and therefore 
no release would be necessary. There is some doubt as to the right 
of a national bank to give such information because of a some-
what questionable holding by a state court that "a national bank 
has no power to engage in the business of furnishing to depositors 
... [such information]."23 Clearly inapplicable to the occasional 
rendering of such infonnation, which could not be deemed to be 
"engaging in the business of furnishing" information, this case 
is unlikely to be found applicable even where a continuous prac-
tice of rendering such information was found. The furnishing 
of credit information by banks has become so widespread there is 
little doubt that it would be deemed an implied power of a na-
tional bank. But the case has never been specifically overruled 
and is still occasionally cited for the proposition that a national 
bank lacks the power to furnish credit information. 
Somewhat related to the consideration of the power of a bank 
to furnish credit information with the customer's consent is the 
question of whether the furnishing of such information is within 
the scope of the bank's duties. It appears that there is no legal 
obligation on the bank to disclose information.24 For business 
21 E.g., Hindman v. First Nat'! Bank, 98 Fed. 562, 567 (6th Cir. 1899): "It is the 
usual practice for depositors and customers of a bank to refer others to the bank for 
information as to their financial responsibility. To give such information to third per-
sons or to the public at the instance of the customer or depositor is certainly not 
beyond the scope of banking powers." Cf. Comment, 31 MARQ. L. REv. 97 (1947). 
22 This is an example of what was meant by the fourth exception to the banker's 
duty stated in Toumier. See note 16 supra. 
23 People's Nat'! Bank v. Southern States Fin. Co., 192 N.C. 69, 77, 133 S.E. 415, 
422 (1926). But see 1 PATON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 627. 
24 Cf. Lemke v. First Nat'! Bank, 190 Wis. 223, 208 N.W. 946 (1926); Consolidated 
Milling Co. v. Fogo, 104 Wis. 92, 80 N.W. 103 (1899); Comment, 31 MARQ. L. REv. 
97, 100 (1947). 
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reasons it is unlikely that the bank would refuse to supply the 
requested information, but generally no one, not even the cus-
tomer himself,25 can, without the aid of a subpoena, demand that 
it be given. However, as the duty of secrecy is based only upon 
an implied agreement, it appears that the bank and customer 
could specifically agree to the furnishing of certain information 
to third parties. 
Somewhere between the questions of the bank's power and its 
duty to disclose information is the question of its liability vel non 
for disclosure of erroneous or misleading customer information, 
upon which third parties have relied to their detriment.26 The 
answer usually depends to a great extent upon the particular fact 
situation, but generally an employee ( especially a cashier) cannot, 
merely by virtue of his position with the bank, make the bank 
liable for his having given such information.27 Even if it is shown 
that the bank has a customary practice of furnishing such infor-
mation, liability will not be imposed unless it can be shown also 
that the bank's misrepresensation was intentional,28 or unless the 
bank can be proved to have later discovered its error, and then 
knowingly received benefits from the giving of the information.29 
When No Consent Has Been Given: It is important to deter-
mine how long the obligation of silence continues and to what 
information it should apply. Only Tournier has spoken on these 
points and there the judges agreed that the contractual obligation 
did not have a retroactive scope and therefore did not extend to 
information received prior to the creation of the banker-customer 
relationship, but that it did apply after the termination of the 
relationship to information received during its existence.30 The 
court split on whether the duty extended to information received 
through another customer's account but during the existence of 
25 It is clear the relationship between banker and customer, whatever else it might 
be, is not that of principal and agent. As to the dispute on the actual nature of this 
relationship, see authorities cited in notes 11 and 12 supra. 
2i3 See cases collected in Annot., 48 A.L.R. 528 (1927). See also Comment, 31 MARQ. 
L. REv. 97 (1947). 
27 See, e.g., Taylor v. Commercial Bank, 174 N.Y. 181, 66 N.E. 726 (1903). See also 
1 PATON, op. cit. supra note I, at 629. 
28 See, e.g., Park 8e Tilford Import Corp. v. Passaic Nat'l Bank 8e Trust Co., 129 
N.J.L. 436, 30 A.2d 24 (1943); cf. Hindman v. First Nat'I Bank, 112 Fed. 931 {6th Cir. 
1902). See also 1 PATON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 629. 
29 See Martin v. Gotham Nat'l -Bank, 211 N.Y.S. 828 (Sup. Ct. 1925). But see 
Shriver v. Fourth Nat'! Bank, 121 Kan. 388, 247 Pac. 443 (1926). 
30 Tournier v. National Provincial 8e Union Bank of England, [1924] 1 K.B. 461, 481. 
• 
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plaintiff's. Lord Justice Scrutton felt that although the disclosure 
was a breach of defendant's duty to the drawer of the check, it 
was not a breach as to plaintiff.31 The majority adopted as its 
test whether the information had been received during the cur-
rency of plaintiff's account and in defendant's role as banker.32 
Arguably this is an unwarranted extension of the bank's duty, 
as the information was not received by the bank in its role as 
plaintiff's banker. However, it was certainly only because of its 
role as plaintiff's banker that defendant had any interest in the 
information received through the drawer of the check's account 
and passed the information to his employer. Therefore the ex-
tension seems justified on the facts of this case. And after bal-
ancing the importance of personal credit with the many exceptions 
already stated to the general duty of secrecy, it appears that this 
broader duty is a legitimate and welcome extension of the scope 
of the customer's protection. 
A bank may be compelled to reveal information concerning 
its customers even in the absence of a subpoena, but only in 
certain limited instances. The most obvious of these exceptions 
to the duty of secrecy is the bank stockholder's right to investigate 
the bank's books.33 In reference to the duty found in Tournier, 
one court said: 
"A bank's contract with a customer not to disclose informa-
tion concerning his transactions with it cannot override the 
rule of law giving stockholders of the bank a right to inspect 
its books and records."84 
The right of a shareholder to inspect a bank's books has been 
abolished by statute in some jurisdictions,35 but generally such 
right exists, safeguarded by a certain amount of discretion in the 
court to refuse inspection if the good faith or motive of the share-
holder are questionable.36 Although the shareholder has this right, 
the fact that the inquiry is made by another customer of the ,bank 
s1 Id. at 482. 
32 Id. at 474, 485; see Winslow, Banker's Duty of Secrecy, 32 CASE & CoM. 8 (1926); 
76 SOL. J. 120 (1932). 
33 See Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905). 
34 State ex rel. G. M. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 23-24, 22 
N.W .2d 911, 916-17 (1946). 
311 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 5-1035 (1947). 
36 Cf. Bank Shareholder's Right of Inspection, 25 BANKING L.J. 17, 22 (1908). 
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is not a relevant factor in determining when a bank may be com-
pelled to reveal information.37 
In certain instances there may exist a special relationship be-
tween the bank and inquirer which would require the bank to 
reveal information concerning one of its customers. An example 
is the situation where the inquirer is another bank, for whom the 
depositor's bank becomes a collection agent. In this instance, the 
bank has the duty in the absence of a subpoena to furnish the 
information about the activities or affairs of its customers. 38 This 
seems to be a legitimate exception to the contractual duty of 
secrecy because of prevailing business practices and the need to 
afford special protection in this limited number of special rela-
tionships. 
If a bank discloses information in violation of its duty of se-
crecy, it theoretically exposes itself to liability for all damages 
directly resulting from its breach of duty.39 However, in the ma-
jority of cases recovery would be limited to nominal damages 
because of the customer's difficult burden of showing actual finan-
cial damage.40 The defenses available to the bank for its breach 
of duty are the same ones discussed above regarding liability for 
misrepresentation to third persons, i.e., that the disclosure was 
beyond the scope of the bank's power or beyond the scope of the 
employee's duty. As was mentioned earlier, this first defense is 
probably no longer available because of the generally recognized 
power of a bank to give this information.41 The second is largely 
a matter to be determined from the facts of each individual case. 
Apart from the possibility of a contractual liability for breach 
of the non-disclosure obligation, the bank may also subject itself 
to a suit for libel or slander by the offended customer.42 Truth, 
of course, is a complete defense to such an action,43 and the bank 
s7.,see, e.g., People's Nat'l Bank v. Southern States Fin. Co., 192 N.C. 69, 133 
S.E. 415 (1926). 
38 Grant County Deposit Bank v. Greene, 200 F.2d 835 (6th Cir. 1952). 
39 Cf. Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 392, 146 Atl. 34, 37 (1929). 
4-0 See 1 PATON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 619. 
41 It is clearly within the power of state banks to give this information and almost 
as clearly within the power of national banks. See authorities cited in notes 21 and 23 
supra. 
42 Cf. Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47, 127 Pac. 533 (1912); Lewis & Herrick v. 
Chapman, 16 N.Y. 369 (1857). 
43 See, e.g., Pennington v. Little, 266 Ky. 750, 99 S.W.2d 776 (1936). See generally 
33 AM. JuR., Libel & Slander §§ 117, 119 (1941). 
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is further protected by a qualified privilege of confidential com-
munications, available when the information has been given in 
good faith to one having an interest in the information sought.44 
An example of the application of the latter defense is the case 
where in response to a telephoned request from another bank the 
defendant bank stated mistakenly that plaintiff had no account 
with it. Having spoken in good faith to another bank, defendant 
bank was protected from liability by its qualified privilege.45 How-
ever, if the inquirer has no legitimate interest in the information 
sought, the bank will be liable in libel or slander for even a good 
faith disclosure of erroneous information. 
Disclosure in Response to Subpoena 
A bank cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimination 
to justify refusing to disclose information when properly sub-
poenaed.46 Nor is there any authority which indicates bank rec-
ords are privileged communications free from the reach of sub-
poena.47 On the contrary, the writers draw a clear distinction 
between privilege, meaning freedom from testimonial compul-
sion-in the lawyer-client type of communication-and the so-
called "qualified" privilege, meaning freedom from disclosure in 
the absence of subpoena-in the banker-customer type of com-
munication.48 
It would be clearly unwarranted to extend the freedom from 
testimonial compulsion to banker-customer communications. Such 
an extension would be a clear violation of the balancing aspect of 
Wigmore's famous test for the existence of such a privilege: 
"The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure 
44 Cf. Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47, 127 Pac. 533 (1912); Froslee v. Lund's State 
Bank, 131 Minn. 435, 155 N.W. 619 (1915). See generally 33 AM. JuR., Libel & Slander 
§ 170 (1941). 
411 Rothholz v. Dunkle, 53 N.J.L. 438, 22 Atl. 193 (1891). 
46 See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1943), and authorities cited therein. As 
the privilege against self-incrimination is purely a personal privilege, it cannot be used 
on behalf of a corporation. 
47 The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that bank records are 
subject to subpoena by court order. See, e.g., In re Davies, 68 Kan. 791, 75 Pac. 1048 
(1904); Smith v. Dawson, 234 S.W. 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1450 
(1937). 
48 See Limburg, supra note 1, at 152. On the privilege as to lawyer-client communi-
cations, see 8 WIGM0RE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2329 (McNaughton rev. 1961) and McCORMICK, 
EVIDENCE §§ 91-100 (1954). 
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of the communications must be greater than the benefit 
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."49 
While the privilege as to lawyer-client communications rests 
soundly upon the justifiable argument that encouragement of full 
disclosure in this area benefits society,50 and would in fact be 
discouraged without such a privilege, the social necessity for pro-
viding testimonial protection to a bank customer's communica-
tions is clearly outweighed by the harm such a barrier would do 
to the fact-finding process in cases in which such information was 
relevant, and the probability that absence of privilege will not 
curtail the relationship. Admittedly it is from the rationale of 
qualified privilege that many pressure groups have argued, some 
successfully, for the creation of new statutory privileges.51 The 
most closely related of these new privileges is that applied to 
accountant-client communications now recognized in eleven states 
and one territory.52 Arguably there is sufficient need to encourage 
full disclosure to an accountant because of the need for competent 
counseling in complex tax matters to justify this extension of 
privilege.53 By comparison, the extension of full privilege, as com-
pared to a qualified form of privilege, to banker-customer com-
munications is not warranted by any counter-balancing consider-
ation and would be contrary to well-reasoned opinion against 
further extension of testimonial privilege. 54 
Nevertheless, the customer is legally entitled to some protec-
40 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 48, § 2285, at 527. The other parts of the test are 
as follows: "(l) The communications must originate in confidence that they will not 
be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintainance of the relation between the parties. (3) The relation must be one 
which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered." 
50 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 48, § 2291. But even this privilege has been ques-
tioned. See McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 48, § 91, at 182, "If one were legislating for 
a new commonwealth, without history or customs, it would be hard to maintain that 
a privilege for lawyer-client communications would facilitate more than it would ob-
struct the administration of justice." 
51 See Note, 5 VAND. L. REv. 590, 601 (1952) where many of the new privileges, i.e., 
accountant-client, newspaper reporter-informant, are discussed. 
52 For the most recent discussion of the accountant-client privilege, see Kasner, 
Confidential Communications Between Accountant and Client, 6 DRAKE L. REv. 92 (1957). 
Cf. Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), in which a certified public accountant's 
deposition, taken under authority of subpoena, as to his audit of corporation's books 
was properly suppressed by an Illinois federal district court to enforce his privilege 
under Illinois statute prohibiting a court from requiring a public accountant to divulge 
information or evidence obtained by him in a confidential capacity. 
53 This argument is made in Note, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 453, 455 (1954). 
54 See McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 48, § 81, at 166 n.7. 
1962] COMMENTS 791 
tion even when a subpoena is used, and the bank should give him 
this protection. It has been held that a banker may refuse to 
disclose information concerning a customer's affairs to a public 
official who fails to follow the proper procedure for securing such 
information, 55 and, in a closely related area, that a stockbroker 
need not reveal information not material to the issues under 
investigation.56 It would appear, in fact, that the banker has a 
positive duty to refuse to reveal information under such circum-
stances. But where the proper procedures have been followed the 
bank is bound to comply with the subpoena, and the customer, 
who has no greater power in this respect than the bank, cannot 
prevent compliance.57 However, a situation may arise wherein 
the customer can demand protection in the form of an injunction 
to prevent wrongful disclosure. In one Third Circuit case58 an 
injunction was granted to prevent a violation of the fourth amend-
ment protection against "illegal search and seizure" where reve-
nue agents demanding the customer's records from the bank had 
failed to show cause for obtaining the records. Use of the case as 
a precedent is weakened by the fact that the court later sustained 
the subpoena after the Government justified its need to investi-
gate the subpoenaed records, and approved, obiter, the rule that 
a third party does not have standing to invoke the protection of 
the fourth amendment.59 However, in the proper situation, per-
haps where the statutory prerequisites for securing a customer's 
accounts have not been met, the doctrine of the earlier Third 
Circuit decision may once again be found applicable. 
Internal Revenue Investigations 
A considerable number of cases have been decided on the re-
lationship of a banker and his customer concerning information 
55 See Hansen, Internal Revenue Examinations of Customers' Accounts, 73 BANKING 
L.J. 163 (1956). 
G6 Jonau v. Ferrand, 3 Rob. (La.) 364 (1842). 
57 Cf. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937), where a broker's customer tried 
to prevent the broker from complying with subpoena issued by the SEC on the grounds 
that (1) broker-customer relations were privileged, and (2) compliance would constitute 
an unreasonable search of the customer. Both grounds were rejected and the court 
refused to extend testimonial privilege to broker-client communications. 
llS Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936). 
59 Zimmerman v. Wilson, 25 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1938), afj'd, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 
1939). The "standing" rule in this context was first set forth in McMann v. SEC, 87 
F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937). 
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held by the former demanded by Internal Revenue Service 
agents.00 Clearly the Internal Revenue Service has the power to 
subpoena customer records from a bank.61 That the bank will be 
put to a certain amount of trouble in order to comply is no excuse 
for refusal, for a bank, like all of society, has a duty to aid in the 
enforcement of the law.62 However, there exist certain well-organ-
ized limitations -On this power of inquiry. Before obtaining a 
subpoena the revenue agent "must specify with sufficient preci-
sion for their identification the documents desired to be inspected. 
His demands must be within the scope of the statute . . . [ and] 
he must also allege that such documents 'bear upon the matters 
required to be included in the return' in question."63 Where these 
conditions have not been met, the bank owes a duty to its cus-
tomers to refuse to furnish the requested documents. But in actual 
practice, apparently, far less may suffice to secure the information 
sought. From a study of several Los Angeles and New York banks 
it appears many banks have no set procedure for dealing with 
Internal Revenue requests for customer records.64 Some furnish 
the desired information upon the mere showing of proper cre-
dentials while others require the agent to produce a subpoena 
before releasing any customer information to him.65 Even more 
surprising than the unsystematic handling of requests for informa-
tion is the fact that some banks do not attempt to notify customers 
that their accounts are under subpoena while others, having no 
set notice procedure, will notify only "important customers."66 
In order to be consistent with its duty to maintain the secrecy 
of its customer's records in the absence of subpoena, a bank should, 
at the very minimum (I) notify the customer of the investigation; 
(2) prohibit inspection without a court order; (3) check the pro-
cedure followed by the agent and the order itself to assure com-
pliance with the statutory requirements; and (4) adopt and follow 
a uniform procedure for handling such requests. Such action on 
the part of the bank might delay tax investigations, but for a 
60 E.g., First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947). 
61 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7602. See Note, 75 BANKING L.J. 9 (1958). 
62 Washington Nat'! Bank v. Daily, 166 Ind. 631, 77 N.E. 53 (1906). 
63 First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1947). 
64 Bailin, Banks Ordinarily Cooperate with Internal Revenue Service in Tax Exami-
nations of Customers, 14 J. TAXATION 220 (1961). 
65 Ibid. 
66 Id. at 221. 
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bank to do less than the above is clearly inconsistent with its duty 
to its customers. If the procedure proves too great an interference 
with tax investigations, Congress may always amend the Internal 
Revenue Code. But it is not the role of a bank to determine the 
degree of cooperation to which the Service is entitled at the 
expense of the customer's privilege of non-disclosure. 
State Statutes 
A scattering of statutes pertaining to various aspects of the 
bank-customer duty of secrecy can be found among the states. 
Exemplary are a Montana statute67 revoking the shareholder's 
right to inspect the books and records of a bank, and section 36(10) 
of the New York Banking Law. The latter reads: 
"All reports of examinations and investigations, corre-
spondence and memoranda concerning or arising out of such 
examination and investigations, including any duly authen-
ticated copy or copies thereof in the possession of any banking 
organization, bank holding company or any subsidiary 
thereof ... foreign banking corporation, licensed lender, 
licensed casher of checks, or the savings and loan bank of the 
state of New York or the banking department, shall be con-
fidential communications, shall not be subject to subpoena 
and shall not be made public unless, in the judgment of the 
superintendent, the ends of justice and the public advantage 
will be subserved by the publication thereof, in which event 
he may publish or authorize the publication of a copy of any 
such report or any part thereof in such manner as he may 
deem proper."68 
In a recent case60 interpreting this language, the court upheld 
immunity from subpoena by refusing to allow a letter from the 
New York Department of Banks to a trust company to be intro-
duced into evidence and by sustaining a decision of the Superin-
tendent of Banking that there was no public advantage to be 
gained by allowing the information to be disclosed. Since the 
documents described in the statute are "confidential communica-
tions" and "not subject to subpoena," it would seem to follow that 
67 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 5-1035 (1947). 
68 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 36(10). 
60 Clark v. Flynn, 9 App. Div. 2d 249, 193 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1959). 
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a bank could refuse to disclose them or their contents in the 
absence of subpoena as well as under the directives of one. 
No state has attempted to deal with the over-all problem by 
enacting a comprehensive statement of the bank's duty to main-
tain the confidence of information received concerning its cus-
tomers. 
Foreign Law and the Duty of Secrecy 
The most comprehensive and perhaps most familiar foreign 
banking law is that of Switzerland. The banking secrecy aspect 
of the Swiss law is but one of the so-called secrecy laws by which 
the Swiss attempt to effectuate their notion that each individual is 
entitled to a "sphere of secrecy (Geheimsphare)." One writer has 
stated: 
"The 'banking secret' has long been recognized as part of 
such 'sphere of secrecy.' The banking secret is an obligation 
of the banks or bankers not to disclose any information about 
their clients which might come to their attention in the 
course of their business.''70 
A violation of the duty of secrecy was originally considered a tor-
tious offense subjecting the violator to civil liability only. In 
1934, however, this duty was made statutory71 and it was made a 
crime for anyone to induce the disclosure, or for a bank to disclose 
the confidential information given it by a customer. Article 47 
of the Banking Act states: 
"Whoever intentionally ... 
"(b) in his capacity as an officer or employee of a bank, or 
as an auditor or his assistant, or as a member of the banking 
commission, or as an officer or employee of its bureau, violates 
his duty to observe silence or professional secrecy; or whoever 
induces or attempts to induce a person to commit such an 
offense, shall be fined not more than 20,000 Francs, or shall 
be imprisoned for not longer than six months, or both .... " 
Enacted originally to prevent foreign economic espionage in pre-
World War II Europe, the Swiss law entitles the bank customer 
70 Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 284, 288 (1955). 
'l1 Bundesgesetz iiber die Banken und Sparkassen (Vom 8. Nov. 1934) 51 AMTLICHE 
SAMMLUNG DER BUNDESGESETZE UND VERORDNUNGEN 117. 
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to a broad scope of protection, including protection from tax in-
vestigations. Moreover, since privileged communications are a 
matter of cantonal rather than federal law, the banker's privilege 
to refrain from testifying to customer information is not uniform. 
Admittedly, the circumstances present in the United States are 
not the same as those which prompted the Swiss to enact their 
banking secrecy statute, and it would probably be unwise for the 
United States to extend an exemption from testimonial compul-
sion to the banker. Certainly there is no need in the United 
States for criminal sanctions to punish the breach of the banker's 
duty. 
A number of American cases have involved the secrecy aspect 
of Swiss and other foreign banking laws. The Second Circuit in 
two recent decisions has drawn an interesting distinction in the 
foreign banking field on the effect of service of a subpoena by a 
United States court. In the first case72 it was held that an Ameri-
can bank may be required by subpoena to produce records of its 
Panamanian branch, while in the second73 it was held that the 
domestic branch of a Canadian bank should not be served with a 
subpoena requiring the production of records held by the parent. 
In the latter case there was some question as to whether sending 
the records out of Canada would violate Canadian law. The court, 
concerned about a possible violation of its neighbor's laws, noted 
that there were other devices, potentially less troublesome, avail-
able to secure the requested information and held that the sub-
poena should not have been issued. The court referred to its ear-
lier decision in the case involving foreign branches of an American 
bank where it had indicated that enforcement of the subpoena 
would be qualified if Panamanian law prohibited compliance. 
This concern over the possible violation of foreign banking 
law and the effect of this concern on a subpoena issued in the 
United States is an extension of the Supreme Court opinion in 
Societe Internationale v. Rogers.74 In that case the district court 
non-suited a plaintiff who was unable to bring certain banking 
records out of Switzerland and into court without violating 
Swiss law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where 
plaintiff had done all that was possible to secure the records 
72 First Nat'! City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959). 
73 Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960). 
74 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
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short of violating Swiss law, he should at least be permitted to 
proceed to trial although he was to be in no way relieved from his 
burden of proof, which without the requested records might well 
prove insurmountable. 75 
Conclusion 
The basic problem is, as has been stated before, uncertainty 
regarding the exact posture of the law in the United States on this 
question. Speculation and conjecture as to the probable applica-
bility of the Tournier doctrine may be an interesting academic 
exercise but it will not suffice to provide a solution. Nor will an 
understanding of the cases which have held that no privilege from 
disclosure existed provide the final answer. What is needed is a 
positive statement of the bank's duty, either by statute or a self-
regulatory banking code, which will properly balance certain rele-
vant interests: (1) the bank customer's need for protection of his 
credit; (2) the bank's commercial need to reveal customer infor-
mation in certain situations; (3) the need of the economy for the 
free flow of credit information; and (4) the public need for dis-
closure in certain important situations. 
The foundation of any code must be the recognition of the 
general primacy of the customer's need for privacy and protec-
tion of his credit. The need for protection of credit is, of course, 
subordinate to the desirability of disclosure of credit information 
to one, such as another bank, who has a legitimate interest in the 
information. Unless there is present such commercial necessity, 
or the express consent of the customer,76 or a validly obtained 
subpoena, the bank should have the duty to refuse to disclose 
any information obtained during the bank-customer relationship. 
From these basic premises all other rules should follow. 
It is apparent that the public interest is such that bank records 
should not be placed beyond reach of subpoena by the enactment 
of a privilege. Nevertheless, the bank should be obliged to adopt 
a procedure for dealing with such demands which will give each 
customer maximum protection. The customer should be notified 
75 Id. at 198. 
76 It may also be desirable to infer the customers consent when he has, in relevant 
dealings with a potential creditor, informed that person of the identity of his bank. 
In the absence of such an inference, the request for information (and consequently, in 
all probability, the customer's request for credit) would be denied, to the detriment 
of no one but the non-consenting customer. 
1962] COMMENTS 797 
of the impending inspection, and the inspection request should 
be refused unless consented to by the customer, or authorized by 
a court or other body with the subpoena power. The bank should 
further require a showing of full compliance with statutory or 
judicially enunciated prerequisites for obtaining such informa-
tion. 
If a bank discloses information in breach of its duty, it should 
be liable according to contract damage rules, compensating the 
customer for all provable injuries resulting directly from breach, 
as well as indirect injuries reasonably foreseeable at the time the 
relationship was begun. The bank should also remain liable for 
libel or slander when incorrect information has been given, sub-
ject still, however, to the qualified-privilege exception for infor-
mation given in good faith to one having an interest in the infor-
mation. 
Whether a statute be enacted, judicial rules promulgated or a 
private code adopted, some specific measures are needed to bring 
greater clarity and uniformity to the treatment of customer infor-
mation. The problem exists, and the basic doctrines and policies 
are apparent. It remains only for the legislatures, the courts, or 
the banks to coordinate them. 
Robert B. Wessling, S.Ed. 
